Planetary Economics: getting to a stable climate with a healthy economy – UCL Lunch Hour Lecture

Good afternoon everyone. I’m Dr Danai Azaria, I’m a lecturer in international law
at the Faculty of Laws at UCL. It is with particular pleasure
that I’m hosting today’s UCL lunch hour
lecture by Professor Grubb, who is a professor of international
energy and climate change policy at UCL at the Institute
of Sustainable Resources. He’s also the editor-in-chief
of Climate Policy and is a chair of the UK panel
of technical experts on energy market reform. His lecture is entitled ‘Planetary Economics: getting to a
stable climate with a healthy economy’, which for me this is a very timely topic of importance and interest worldwide. I will give the floor to Professor Grubb
for approximately 35 minutes and then I will open the floor
to questions from the audience. For those of you who would like
to tweet about the event, the event’s Twitter feed
is @UCLLHL, you can find it at
the PowerPoint behind us and those of you who would like
to ask questions through Slido, the event code is 5021,
again that code is behind us. So without further ado
I give the floor to Professor Grubb. Thank you very much. I’d actually like to start perhaps
by dating myself and asking, how many of you know in outline
‘The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy’? Good, well in that case you know
the answer ultimate is 42 and I’m going to start by saying the
answer to this lecture on climate change and one of the great challenges
of the 21st century is 3. I hope, by the end of the lecture, you’ll see what I mean and what kind of questions I have
associated with that answer. I’m going to start, and I pitch this
at a pretty broad conceptual level, about the role of economic thinking, in either succeeding or failing, in helping us to get to grips
with climate change. I’m going to start with
a straightforward question in one way, what is economics? There’s been a long-standing debate about the extent to which economics is
a science which economist like to claim, or is it an art. Being old-fashioned I first
turned to the Oxford English Dictionary and discovered, no question Economics
is ‘the science of political economy’. You need to know what is political
economy, and the answer is it’s ‘the art of managing the resources
of people and its government’. Now when we’re dealing with
climate change and its economics, we’re therefore dealing with science
and art of a problem in which the people
are basically everyone on the planet today
and future generations. The resources concern the planet, its atmosphere, oceans and
climatic patterns, and there is no global government
to solve that problem for us. It’s a very unusual problem in terms
of its sheer scale and scope, and that’s the challenge that I really
want to explore in this talk. I’m not going to dwell on the science, I’m not even going to address
what exactly is a stable climate, but I think it’s pretty clear
we don’t have one and we are heading pretty rapidly
in the opposite direction. What you see on the left here
is a sort of classic graph of global temperature trends along with the oscillations
and the uncertainties going back, and on the right is a rather neat
graphic someone pitched this morning, about how temperature has evolved
over the last hundred and so years. It’s moving towards the boundaries
which have been suggested by science and written into the Paris agreement
just over a year ago that you should stay within two degrees and try and keep as close to 1.5
as possible, and we’re already getting close
to that limit. Can we solve a problem on this scale? Well there’s been an awful lot written, it remains fundamentally a problem
of big picture risk management, with deep uncertainty, not so much about
the fundamental science, and at a simple level it’s actually
pretty straightforward, but what are the consequences of accumulating greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere, changing radioactive balance etc. And even worse
from an economic perspective, how do you value them,
how do you act, how do you coordinate
responses etc. In recent years it’s gained a number
of aphorisms about it, Nick Stern perhaps the most famous
economist in the area called it, ‘the biggest market failure in history’, because it imposes damages
which aren’t costed into the market. It’s also been called the
‘perfect moral storm’ because it involves ethical questions
about our responsibilities to others in other countries,
future generations etc, and social scientists call this
a ‘super wicked’ problem, a wicked one is bad enough, super wicked
is fantastically complicated, very political system to solve. It has to be said we’ve not
been doing very well globally. I hate to admit
I’ve been in this area since the first report of the intergovernmental panel
on climate change and the UN framework
that followed in 92, so for quarter of a century we’ve been
bashing our heads against this, but global emissions keep on rising,
and probably still are, although we could go into interesting
changes in the last year or two. A few years ago, around the time I’d sat down, I’d left
my previous job at UK Carbon Trust to try and pull together,
why is this so hard? Why are we struggling so hard? I was asked to give a lecture
in Paris by Laurence Tubiana, who became French ambassador and special
envoy for the Paris Climate conference, a central figure in that. Foolishly I accepted the invitation,
then asked what was the question. She said, well I want you to talk about
whether economics has helped or hindered our getting to grips with this problem. Now I was in the Economics Faculty
in Cambridge University and chief economist at the Carbon Trust,
so it’s a provocative question, but it was also a very interesting one and it helps to shape the inquiry
in the resulting book. The prelude to this, I want to just outline and keep it in the back of your
mind as we go through the rest, the fact that there is no single uniform
view of cost benefits and risks. If we take, if you like,
a classical economic construction, you want to try and establish what are
the damages that could be imposed, where are the tangible impacts that
can be attributed to climate change, and weigh up the costs and benefits, and that should lead you to estimate
a social cost of carbon emissions, the damage inflicted by emitting a tonne
of CO2 and you should then put that as a price
added on, basically all fossil fuel activities. Then the market should solve the
problem, you have solved
‘the greatest market failure in history’ by putting a price on it. That’s not however
the only way of approaching it, if we’re honest most people,
most of the time, and most of the world are probably closer
to being indifferent, don’t know,
or disempowered ” I can’t really do anything about it,
it’s too big, it’s beyond my reach” and frankly the best psychological
approach in that circumstance is usually the old phrase
‘ignorance is bliss’. Try and believe there’s not a problem
to be solved because you can’t solve it. That’s broadly where we’ve been for the
first few decades of climate change, we are now quite clearly moving
beyond that in terms of, at least, the observed impact and imposed costs. At the other end of the spectrum
is a third level of risk conception, which says, “well, I can’t evaluate
exactly the tangible costs and add them all up
in a nice economic calculation, but frankly this is going
to disrupt human society, has the potential to. We want to be secure,
we want our food to be secure. In effect, it’s more analogous
to keeping the country safe, it’s what the CIA calls climate
is a threat multiplier, we have enough problems in the world
without climate instability added on, and what you want to do is to contain
the problem, defend the problem, mitigate emissions enough to be
sufficiently safe and adapt to the rest. Now if unchecked, ultimately we will all end up with
security threatened by climate change, the most vulnerable regions
arguably already are, and indeed there is some
significant empirical evidence that the Syrian war has
a substantial degree of climate change as a factor behind
the collapse of that society. I’m actually not going to say much
more about the impact, because I’m primarily
an energy economist looking at how do we solve
the problem at root, in terms of the drivers
of emissions. Therefore I’ll try and construct
an outline just an initial framing
of the energy CO2 challenge. Clearly we want to try
and decarbonise global economy, decarbonise energy mix
carbon per unit of energy, and we want to enhance
global energy efficiency. We want to get more
‘bang for the buck’ of what we consume. The chart here is showing,
with the black line of the top left, on those two axes, the progress that we made
from 1980 to 1990, the decade after two really dramatic
oil shocks, shook the global economy and the global energy system. You can see we did significantly
improve global energy efficiency, and economic output per unit of energy, we made a little bit of progress
in decarbonisation, but then than that quickly ran out
and we’ve remained pretty flat since. In the subsequent
two decades to 2010, we actually slowed down even
the efficiencies, and didn’t do much, if anything, in the way
of global decarbonisation. Now the real story fortunately is much
more complex and interesting but it’s a useful context. We have to focus on the dynamics
of how we change these huge systems. What the rest of the chart shows is a typical proxy is if we are going to get close to the
goal set out, we need to halve global emissions
by mid-century and that is the outer red
dotted line there, and it can be any sort of combination
of decarbonising the energy mix and improving energy efficiency, except that actually if you look
at the upper black dotted line you have a quite inconceivable rate whereby you would have
to improve global energy efficiency, given where we got in the last 30 years, and if you take the other extreme, you basically have to turn
a complete right angle and suddenly decarbonise
in a very radical way, and I know very few economists who think
either of those is actually feasible. What most scenarios suggest might be
feasible, is a strong mix of both. You reduce the scale
of the problem for efficiency, and you roll out low-carbon
energy sources as quickly as you can. Historical average rate of efficiencies
has been about 1.3 percent, these kind of scenarios suggest we need
to get global emissions down 20 percent from 1990 levels. We’ve gone up since, within what is now
just a 13-year period, which is pretty dramatic andchallenging. A central point here is, this is not just a bit of deviation
from business as usual, it’s not a little bit of
acceleration or change, this is a radical transformation
that will be required. Now if you put yourself in the mindset
of a radical transformation you need to think more deeply about what
can economics sensibly contribute. A way of framing
the classical economic view on this is to say well, you know, we have
certain resources, vertically here, we use those resources
to generate economic welfare, output consumption,
whatever you want to call it, and there’s this kind of, actually most textbooks
just put it as a straight line, I’ve kind of broadened it and
curved a bit for various reasons, but it’s effectively
a technology frontier which says, how can we get
the most out of the resources we have. The assumption is that, that’s where we want to be, that’s where any
decently designed market will be, it will get the best you can and what actually makes
economics interesting, because like that it’s really boring, is there’s thousands of millions
of different inputs to an economy, and getting the best mix is impossibly
complex for any central planner which is why markets tend to deliver
the best allocation of resources given certain assumptions, and including getting the prices right. Economists tend to say well the best
approach is to put a price on carbon, to reflect the damages. Technology is important but it would be
nice if that curve moved. We need research and development if
we can show that the market is not
providing adequate innovation. By the way the kind of estimates that
come out for the social cost of carbon, a measure of the damages, is actually fantastically uncertain, but despite quarter of a century
of research and debate, almost all the estimates are above 30
to 40 dollars or euros, tonne of CO2 which is much bigger than the carbon
price established in any jurisdiction, except for Scandinavia
and a couple of others. So we have a problem, inadequate carbon pricing, uncertainty
about various other elements. What I want to suggest is that was
effectively the scientific expression of an art founded on the assumption that what we’re dealing
with optimising behaviour based on relative prices,
representative agents, i.e. we’re all the same basically, we all do exactly the same behaviour and
maximise output with respect to inputs. We have rational expectations, stable
preferences, technology, trends etc. Given those assumptions, we have an enormous body
of well-established economic theory, typically known as neoclassical
and welfare economics. But that’s not the only kind
of behaviour out there, as it’s not the only kind of way of
approaching the risks and damages. Another way is, or another area
of behaviour decision processes is what has been known
as ‘satisficing’ behaviour which is typified by habits, where you do things the way
that you’re used to doing them. You may be quite averse
to changing that, because you don’t really know,
can’t be bothered, you may be wary of new investment, typically there’s quite a lot of myopia. You don’t think or look very far ahead, you don’t pay much attention
to incidental intangible costs. Let’s face it, how many people in this room
got up this morning and thought, I’m going to optimise
my energy use today. Great, we got one. In my academic career I’ve seen a
certain amount of ideological warfare between these different camps. Who’s really right?
How do people really behave? Is Neoclassical theory
actually good enough etc? My view on that
is it’s the wrong question. The interesting thing is that actually
what these describe are different processes
at different scales, different time scales, so when you look at energy efficiency, most of you would actually find
you could save money that will pay back in a couple of years,
which is actually pretty good deal. So typically short time horizon, whereas markets tend to look a couple
of years to a couple of decades ahead, not more when you look
at financial markets certainly, and transformation processes
can take decades. Last a century. The social unit also changes, small decision-making units
like you and me or a small unit in a firm, and the first domain here, right through to sort of market
structures and large firm behaviour and at the bottom, the global
scale of technology diffusion. Basically all of these theories
are right but they just describe different
processes in different scales. You have three different domains, different characteristics,
different theoretical foundations. The significant thing is where as intrinsically that second domain
involved trade-offs, you have to vary the mix
of resources and reflect the damage. This first domain offers a clear
potential for improved efficiency, improved services, delivered,
I nearly said simply, but not simply, but by changing underlying behaviour
and structural characteristics. Whilst the third domain offers the
potential, for not just bits
of incremental innovation, but whole new technology waves, which we know from economic history have
been the foundation
of economic growth spurts as well. It makes life much more interesting. Now you could say the art therefore is simply recognising that reality is
more complicated than any single theory. You could also argue
that’s fundamental to the science, it’s not mathematical science
but it’s actually observational reality. If we now turn to the question,
well okay if we recognise that, how do we apply the science
to the arts, i.e. what can we deduce
from these different domains. Well I’ve written a 500 page book
on this, from which I’ve only really selected
this one bit of data, which is around this third domain, what do we know about innovation
and transformation processes. Let’s at least start
by looking at some data, on the left what you have is how much do different sectors
spend on innovation. So, IT, pharmaceuticals we think
of being the fount of innovation and that new economic development, spend 10 to 15 percent of their turnover
on innovation. We are really after radical change in,
let’s see, construction and buildings and that cement, oil industry, metal,
steel, incredibly energy intensive etc. We’re after radical innovation in some of the least innovative sectors
in our society. The book develops a theory
about why that is, there is astonishingly little theory
about these inter-sectoral comparisons but I think there’s a very clear
explanation. In this lecture,
I wanted to flag the point that actually when you look
at third Domain economics, what really jumps out is first neither
the pace of innovation nor its direction is self optimising, a market will not deliver
optimal innovation, full stop. Therefore given the role of innovation
and economic growth accelerating such innovation can generate an economic surplus which potentially you can share
between public and private sector. Some of you may know that Mariana
Mazzucato, a world expert on innovation
is joining UCL in March to set up an Institute of Innovation
for public purpose, which is fundamentally good
economics, in my view. Innovation is not synonymous with R&D, it does not just mean throwing a bit
more money at universities, sorry folks. It’s a very complex process
that involves the whole development, demonstration, confidence building
supply chain development, commercialisation, consumer buyer
engagement etc. The economic gains emerge as those
industries get closer to the markets, at which point you’re starting
do something else important, which is to deter more carbon-intensive
stock, which is basically a sunk asset, that will never realise
its full economic value. There’s a lot of worry about climate
policies driving carbon leakage, i.e. dirty industries abroad, the flip side is actually developing
new technologies which then diffuse, chase and ultimately
overwhelm the high-carbon industries, is also intrinsic to a dynamic view
based on these multiple domains, which then also amplifies the economic
gains to those emerging industries, and the gains to pillar one policies which are effectively,
in this first domain, accelerating the adoption of better
technologies and ways of doing it. There’s a whole chapter called
the dark matter of economic growth, because this links right into the heart
of modern debates about economic growth, and the role of structural efficiency
improvements, and the role of innovation, in ways that cannot be explained
under Neoclassical theory. There’s an intimate link here
with the macroeconomic device, I don’t have time to go into that, but I did want to flag
an empirical point in this, which is just to show that it’s not all
concept and not all stuff, a lot has been happening, This has been happening despite
the advice of the economist on renewable energy
looking at solar tariffs, The German energy vendor,
energy transformation said this is absolutely ridiculous. What are the
Germans thinking of? This is a fantastically expensive way
of reducing carbon, costs over a hundred
and fifty dollars per tonne saved. We should abandon all these
technology specific things and just get a general price on carbon. Well, ignoring that advice has actually
lead to a technological revolution with a truly dramatic fall
in solar pv costs, as illustrated there
by more than a factor of 3, and more recently an even more dramatic
fall in the cost of battery, obviously driven partly by electric
vehicles and the clean transport agenda, which means that more than
anything else, solar is the world’s biggest
renewable resource. It’s a vast energy resource, about 10,000 times as much sun
reaches the planet as we actually consume
at any given moment in time. It’s opened up the prospect of low
carbon development at no higher costs, and that is a radical transformation and to say that was economically stupid
is a strange definition of economics. What it does imply is that we are not simply
looking at a question of, we kind of have a normal future and how
much more does it cost to cut emissions. What we’re actually looking at, and I
don’t know if this graph captures it, the future is coming towards you and on the right-hand side you have
a future in which we are investing and getting better at digging
more carbon out of the ground and burning it in all sorts
of new and imaginative ways. We’ve actually invested an awful lot
over the last decade, in basically messing up
the atmosphere more cheaply. We have also been investing quite a lot
on the left hand side of this, which is the more green futures, which tend to be more highly innovative, increasingly integrated, for example the role of electric cars
interface with the electricity system, smart low carbon electricity, biomass potentially in appropriate ways, tends to be more capital-intensive,
but then virtually free to run. All those are very different
than the typical fossil-fuel future. Again this is not a higher cost version
of a fossil fuel future, it’s a radically different way
of developing the energy system. There’s some evidence. First of all, I don’t think we know
which is more costly, it’s going to depend
on how these systems evolve. Probably getting stuck in the middle and
messing around with a bit of both is more costly than either. But it’s a structural choice
about directions to be going, and that implies that policy doesn’t
need to just steer marginal change but more structural systemic change. It needs to use different
pillars of policy that match to the different domains and there are potentially some quite
big economic and financial benefits from just creating
contractual certainty in this. I actually put at the top a quote
from Seneca close to 3,000 years ago. If you don’t have a clue where you’re
going, no wind is likely to be helpful and direction is important. I’m going to start wrapping up this, because first just a compact way I hope, and I’ve skipped sort of
individual policy instruments, but you can kind of try and stitch
things together in this kind of way. I showed you this frontier
and the trade-offs, actually the first domain
stuff is broadly around the fact that most real people
and organisations most of the time are some way to the left of what is
possible with current technology. Therefore helping to move them towards
their frontier is beneficial all round. There are the terminologies that I
introduced into the book with the sort of the name tag and the precision of arguing
there are three domains of processes, of which the third domain is really at
the heart of a transformation strategy, not just the innovation
but the evolution complex system and therefore e you want to be is one of
the lower arrows accelerating innovation but in a low-carbon direction
with economic gain. As I said those processes operate… It’s not a battle
which of those is right, it is what are the different scales
at which these processes dominate. Here is the intellectual crux
of the link with energy and climate, is for a problem which spans
the inattentive decision maker of every person on the planet and at the same time, the long-term transformation of some of
the most complex systems developed. It has to be said so far we’ve made more
progress on energy efficiency, I didn’t show you
the more recent data on that, and technology renewables
which I’ve indicated rather than the classical prescription
of carbon pricing. If I try and wind this up into
conclusions and theory then practice, I come back to Laurence’s question, has economics helped or hindered? My view is, well it depends, it’s been very helpful when
it’s understood and respected the boundaries of the theory and the
assumptions upon which it rest. It has been unhelpful when it tramples
across them and says that people in the world should
behave in this way and therefore a carbon price
is the only thing we need to do. Not rocket science,
but frequently overlooked. I think maybe one reason
it’s overlooked, apart from the fact people
haven’t articulated it in terms of these domains is actually to really
get to grips with it, we are in the land of what I call
interdisciplinary economics. You cannot understand
first domain economics without recognising the social
and psychological foundations upon which both risk perceptions
and behaviours ultimately rest. And you may note an alliance, coming back to my first slide
about risk perception, which is even if people don’t know
and don’t care about climate change, they can still get motivated by saving
money through improved efficiency or by smarter electric car or by all
sorts of other possibilities. The third domain
is not a license to say, “yeah, let the geeks solve this, they’ll
come up with something magic one day”, because reality is constrained by the
engineering and physical determinates of what you can and cannot do, and therefore solar and wind
are really crucial because they are the big
renewable energy resources, and actually we’re doing pretty well
in moving towards technology although not the cost frontiers
of those technologies, so you can’t hope some magic bullet is
going to fall like manna from heaven, you’ve got to get to grips
and use the resources we have. All of the above involves quite powerful
regulatory and institutional damage. I’m sometimes tempted to get drawn
further because I must admit I originally
was originally trained in physics, if you hadn’t guessed I’m a slightly
unorthodox economist in that sense Working through this, I’ve been
very conscious of the fact that for two centuries
we got used to the idea, that Newtonian mechanics
described the universe. It was only when we looked very
small, that kind of didn’t work anymore, and we had to develop
quantum mechanics. We got very big, it didn’t work anymore,
we needed relativity, and therefore it’s sort of natural, this idea that different theories work
at different scales, and I think what’s unusual about energy
and climate change is precisely that, it forces us to consider how 7 billion individuals behave
with respect to energy, and how major massive
complex interlinked systems of technology and business evolve. In terms of the practice, I didn’t have time to go into
the sort of more specific nitty-gritty of what individual things
the governments need to do, but I would say the ultimate key
to solving this problem is integrating the art
and the science. The only art
I was ever good at was music, but as I think in terms of those
terms, what’s a symphony, you can pull with these three things
working in tandem and the point is they can work
as a very strongly reinforcing package. Read the words on the left and get a
sense of how one can help the other in a reinforcing pattern. Now given that and I think it’s clear
that we will see 21st century systems being radically different
from 20th century. The transition is already underway
albeit in the early stages. It’s so far been driven more
by the technology oriented pull policies than by the broader suite including I think appropriate pricing, and that has not been cheap, particularly for Germany
which has led the way, but I think the cost reductions
that have been driven by Germany, California and Chinese
production in particular now mean that the transition
is within global reach of every country, and preferably using more
balanced policy packages, and as I said a clear policy direction
and shift risk can lower the financing costs,
increase the gains to innovation and thereby also create a potential
for an unprecedented, what I think should ideally be public
private coalitions on decarbonisation. That’s basically the ground I
wanted to cover, I hope you’ll forgive me for finishing
with the advert for the book, there are copies available at author’s
discount if you want to let me know. There’s about 500 pages if its inspired
you, but I suspect we’ll just want
a couple of questions. Thank you. This was a very thought-provoking
presentation, so I will open the floor to questions. Thank you very much for your lecture it
was very interesting. I would like to make two questions. The first one is that although your
three domain distinction is very useful and the analogy
with physics works a lot, I think that the quote about Seneca
and the three domains is too much, in the sense that these three domains
let us define where we want to go, and the question
is where do we want to go? In that sense, what is the relationship between
capitalism and climate change mitigation and what kind of economic system
as a society we would like to work to? And the second question
is about the role of universities, particularly UCL for example, to tackle this issue and I wanted to know your
opinion about for example, whether it would be better for UCL to instead of investing more than 12
million pounds in coal and oil industry, it should invest in renewables. Thank you. Would you like to answer directly
or should I take a number of questions? Maybe just briefly on that. In the broad sense, where
we want to go in terms of output is implicit in that slide
I did on risk conceptions, we want to remain safe. We therefore need to follow scientific
guidance on what does safe mean, I think it’s a reasonable interpretation
that between 1.5 and 2 degrees and we are not on track of the moment we need to make much more effort
to get on track. It’s a strategic goal which aligns with
that third domain of implementation, so things like offshore
wind energy in the UK actually are a strategic resource we
need to tap to deliver that objective, you don’t need to get bound up in
arguments about discount rates etc. We need to develop the industries
to tap. Whether capitalism is a problem, that’s a kind of bigger discussion I actually think pricing
is very important. I think economists did damage claiming
it was the only thing that mattered, but I think we are almost at risk now
of the opposite. I think there is a central role
to harnessing markets and pricing as part of this transition, but I’m sure we may disagree, we might
have a much longer conversation. UCL’s investment choice. I’m actually now running a master’s
module on planetary economics and we ask the students to get into
groups and debate one question each week and one of the most entertaining
and interesting ones was the question, very simple, divest or engage, and there were lots of different answers
and they’re all plausible. Thanks so much. Just on pillar two, I was just wondering
if you had any views on the practicalities and effectiveness
of the types of offsetting schemes where, kind of, factories in America
for example, instead decided to clean up
factories in China as a cheaper way of getting more carbon safe per dollar
spent for example and whether that actually works in
practice. Probably depends on
quite a lot of details, there’s a lot of devil in the details, and also what was your question, if the question was how can I deliver
emission reductions in the next few
years as cheaply as possible, there’s a fair chance that somewhere
on the other side of the planet, and you might even do a bit of good in
terms of cleaner technologies there and helping to build up
industries there. On the other hand, if the challenge is a transformational
one and you say, good I can get
cheap emission reductions there and nobody’s scrutinising well
whether it’s additional and that will save me
from anything difficult, it will achieve the reverse. I think there’s evidence of both. There was a huge history around the
clean development mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol
which offered precisely that. It was pretty fundamental
to the US agreeing to it and my verdict on that was, the old Chinese saying ‘be careful what
you ask for because you may get it’, it asked for emission reductions as
cheap as possible and they turned out to
be absolutely dirt cheap, and you could argue
was that actually adequate. You started off
by talking about the fact that no one actually owns
the commons. In other words no one has overarching
responsibility for global resources. If that’s the case what’s the impetus
behind us getting to a place where we’re not going to go over the
temperature limits in 13 years. What’s going to be the urgency
and the driving factor in making this change happen? The classical construction is you have
to have a global burden sharing deal, with global agreement. You have to incur this much cost
to cut your emissions by this much, share out emission targets. I had to skate over this but there’s a
lot of empirical evidence and rationales why that just failed,
didn’t work very well, and the reason
why I’ve gone down this track is saying you know
what that’s not necessary. You don’t need a global burden sharing
deal, this is not a game of burdens, this is a game of investment and returns
and transformation, and you probably need a critical mass, but that critical mass, once formed, can drive a transformation
in the way that we have seen at points in history of major industrial
transformation that then spread out, and usually the originators of that
do extremely well, which is why I finished
on that note about, you can create coalitions which will
solve this problem and if some governments want to cling on
to last century’s energy systems, name no names,
but that is their problem. It’s unfortunate
they will emit more in the meantime but they will not benefit from it. I think the transformation is starting
to happen faster than I expected at the technological level. I think the world is still waiting
to see and working out how to respond to President Trump. On that note I think
unfortunately we’re about to… I tried to avoid that for the whole… Thank you very much for the really
thought provoking lecture today and again thankyou for your time. Thank you
very much

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